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court from taking jurisdiction of the matter.10 This conclusion would
12
be contrary to the weight of authority, both of cases 11 and writers.
The opinion does say that "the courts do not close their doors
unless help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of
the commonweal." The court could have based its decision solely on
this broader concept of public policy without attempting to reconcile
it with the juridical definition.
Whether this reciprocal disability, which precludes a suit by one
spouse against the other for personal injuries, would be promotive of
the public welfare is a debatable question. Sound reasons have been
given in support of both sides. 13
In the instant case the court took the position that the rule of
law exists by tradition and authority, that "rights may not be granted
or withheld by our courts at the pleasure of the judges to suit the
individual notion of expediency and fairness," and any changes must
be addressed to the legislative, not the judicial branch of the
government.
D.R.

LIMITATION OF AcTiONS-SECTION 16, CIVIL PRACTIcE AcTIN INTErnST."-The plaintiff insur-

WHAT CONSTITUTES "UNITED

ance company issued a life insurance policy to defendant's husband
on June 13, 1930, defendant being named as beneficiary. The policy contained a one-year incontestability clause. On April 24, 1931,
plaintiff brought this action to rescind the policy on the grounds of
"0(1931) 79 U.

oF

PA. L. REv. 635.

"In all conflict of law cases it is

obvious that there must be two conflicting rules of law, that of the foreign
state and that of the forum. The rule of the foreign state is to be applied
by the forum unless the public policy of the state of the forum is violated.
But if the public policy of the state of the forum is conceived to be identical
with its law there would never be occasion to resort to the law of the foreign
state for by hypothesis the law of the foreign state is contrary to the law
of the forum; it is therefore contrary to the public policy of the forum and
the situation is that in which the forum will refuse to apply the foreign law."
' Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918) (court
rejected the doctrine that in the absence of similarity of the foreign statute
which created the cause of action and our own statute the action could not
be maintained) ; see also Chicago & E. I. Ry. v. Rouse, 178 Ill. 132, 52 N. E.
951 (1899).
" GooDRIcK, Public Policy it; the Law of Conflicts (1930) 36 W. VA. L.
Q. 156; BE~cH, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights (1918) 27
YALE L. J. 656; BEAL, CONFLIcr OF LAws (1935) § 612. "Differences ;n
law do not necessarily constitute a sufficient basis for a declaration that the
rule of the foreign state is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum."
" Allen v. Allen, 246 N. Y. 571, 159 N. E. 656 (1927), Pound, J. (dissenting opinion); Contra: Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366 (N. Y.
1863).
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misrepresentations in the application as to his health, prior medical
attention, hospitalization, and rejection of his application by another
insurance company, naming defendant as a co-defendant with the
insured. The defendant only was served. The insured died July
14, 1931. The insured had admittedly made certain material misrepresentations. Defendant urged that the Statute of Limitations
was a complete bar to the action because the insured was not served
with a summons. Held, service on the beneficiary was a valid commencement of the action against both the beneficiary and on the insured within the contestability period, under Civil Practice Act, Section 16, which provides that an action is commenced when service
is made on defendant or a co-defendant united in interest with him.'
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Stone, 270 N. Y. 154, 200 N. E. 679
(1936).
Whether the beneficiary is so united in interest with the insured
that service of a summons on. her within the contestability period
would prevent the Statute of Limitations running against the action
is the sole question to be considered. The pertinent Section 2 must
be liberally construed. 3 Although in terms relating only to4 statutory limitations, it applies to limitations fixed by agreement.
To be united in interest, the interest of the defendants in the
subject matter must be such that they stand or fall together, and that
judgment against one will similarly affect the other.
The interests of a beneficiary and the insured under a life policy are inseparable because the avoidance of the policy destroys the
beneficiary's rights in the policy in the same manner that the insured's rights thereunder are abrogated. 6 The beneficiary has a present legal interest in the contract 7 which as between her and the insurer is determined by the contract itself and not by the death of
the insured,8 even though the beneficiary could be changed by the
N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 16: "When Action Deemed to be commenced.
An action is commenced against a defendant, within the meaning of this act
which limits the time for commencing an action, when the summons is served
on him or on a co-defendant who is a joint contractor or otherwise united in
interest with him."
2 Ibid.

'N. Y. Civ. P Ac. AcTs 2, 3.
'N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 10; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Di Novi, 139
Misc. 1, 247 N. Y. Supp. 578 (1931); N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dickler, 135
Misc. 594, 238 N. Y. Supp. 684 (1929).
'Croker v. Williamson, 208 N. Y. 480, 484, 102 N. E. 588, 589 (1913)
(Action to determine validity of a will and its probate. Held, all legatees were
united in interest. The court said: "Their interests (referring to the various
legatees) under the will must stand or fall together, and it would seem to be
pretty clear that they are, therefore, united.")
6Brief for Respondent, p. 24, Prudential Ins. Co. v. Stone, 270 N. Y.
154, 200 N. E. 679 (1936).
'8 Barbin v. Moore, 85 N. H. 362, 159 Atl. 409 (1932).
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U. S. 167, 44 Sup. Ct.
90 (1923); Monahan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 283 Ill. 136, 119 N. E. 68
(1918).
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insured. If not brought in as a party defendant, any later contest9
against her may be barred by the contestability period in the contract.
Co-makers of a note,10 partners as to a firm note,1 1 and insured
and beneficiary of a life policy, 12 have been held united in interest,
while connecting carriers in interstate commerce, 1 3 the owner of
premises and a sub-contractor,14 and the vendor and vendee in an
executory contract for the sale of a lot 15 have been held not to be
united in interest in cases where, one of the parties not having been
served, the Statute of Limitations was interposed as a complete bar
to the action.'

J.K.

CUSTODY
R-ELIGION OF PARENT CoRPus.-Relator is the bedridden mother of a ten-year-old
child, whose custody she seeks as against the father, with whom they
both reside. The mother claims that the child is taken by the father
to a religious sect,' of which he is a member, remote from their place
of residence, thereby depriving her of her legal right to joint custody,
and impairing the physical and moral well being of the child. The

PARENT AND CHILD

HABEAS

9
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Patterson, 1 Fed. 126 (D. Mass.
1880). In Shaw v. Cock, 78 N. Y. 194 (1879), where by order amending the
summons a new party defendant was brought in, the court held that the suit
was only commenced .as to him when thus brought in and if between the time
of the commencement of the action as to the original parties, and the time
when the new defendant was brought in the period of limitation had expired,
a plea of the statute in bar of his liability is good.

"Davison v. Budlong, 40 Hun 245 (N. Y. 1886).

' Howell v. Dimock, 15 App. Div. 102, 44 N. Y. Supp. 271 (2d Dept.

1897).
2 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Di Novi, 139 Misc. 1, 247 N. Y. Supp.
578 (1931) (Summons served upon beneficiary within contestability period,
held to be effective service upon the incompetent insured and the beneficiary).
" Germini v. Southern Pacific Co., 209 App. Div. 442, 204 N. Y. Supp. 603
(1st Dept. 1924).
'4Martens v. O'Neill, 131 App. Div. 123, 115 N. Y. Supp. 260 (2d Dept.
1909).
'Moore v. McLaughlin, 11 App. Div. 477, 42 N. Y. Supp. 256 (3d Dept.
1896) (Action brought against both to foreclose a mechanic's lien on a building erected by the purchaser will not be deemed to have been commenced
against the purchaser by service of the summons on his co-defendant.).
"' 1 WAIT's NEW YORK PRACTICE (3d ed. 1930) 88: If one of the parties
united in interest in an action on a promissory note "was not served in the original action, a subsequent action under section 1185 of the Civil Practice Act
to charge him as a joint debtor would not be a continuation of the former
action but an entirely new action, and would be barred by the statute of limitations ten years after the former judgment was obtained."
' The Megiddo, of Christian persuasion, whose beliefs are not contrary to

